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Legal Loopholes and the Politics of 
Executive Term Limits: Insights from 
Burundi
Stef Vandeginste 
Abstract: The nomination of incumbent Pierre Nkurunziza to stand 
again for president in the 2015 national elections triggered a political and 
security crisis in Burundi. A crucial element in the controversy around his 
third term was the legality of his candidacy. This paper analyses how 
domestic and international actors responded to the legal loopholes that 
characterised Burundi’s term-limit legislation. Three responses are distin-
guished. First, quite paradoxically, an argument was put forward by third-
term supporters that stressed constitutional legality, a value usually in-
voked by third-term opponents. Second, a peace agreement was referred 
to as a source of legitimacy and as a legal norm. Third, a Constitutional 
Court ruling was invoked to address the legal loophole. Despite the ap-
parent irrelevance of legal norms in an increasingly authoritarian envir-
onment, law significantly shaped the dynamics of the third-term debate 
and of the wider crisis. The Burundi case also illustrates the limitations of 
constitutional engineering of democratic governance. 
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In 2015, Burundi experienced its worst political, security, and humanitar-
ian crisis since its successful negotiated transition to peace after over a 
decade of civil war that started in the aftermath of the assassination of 
the country’s first democratically elected president on 21 October 1993 
(Bouka and Wolters 2016). Post-conflict elections were held in 2005 and 
2010. The 2015 crisis was sparked by President Pierre Nkurunziza’s 
announcement of his intention to run for a third term in office on behalf 
of his party, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – 
Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). While the crisis 
was not solely due to the president’s potential third term, this issue had a 
major impact on the political situation both before and after the 2015 
elections (Vandeginste 2015a). It gave rise to a split within the CNDD-
FDD, resulting in the destabilisation of Burundi’s state institutions. 
Furthermore, it led to unprecedented street protests in the capital city 
Bujumbura that culminated in a failed coup d’état on 13 May 2015. In 
the violence that followed the coup attempt, independent media outlets 
were closed down and many civil society activists were forced into exile 
(Frère 2016). Hundreds of civilians were tortured and/or killed, while 
more than 200,000 people fled to neighbouring countries. Rebel move-
ments announced they would undertake an armed struggle to topple the 
Nkurunziza government.  
Objectives and Approach
This case study is both inductive and hypothesis-generating (Levy 2008: 
4–5). First, zooming in on the law and politics of the third-term crisis, it 
seeks to enrich our understanding of both the breakdown of Burundi’s 
internationally applauded transition from conflict to peace and the inter-
national involvement with the crisis (Bouka 2016; Wilen 2016). The crisis 
around the presidential term limit occurred in a context of sustained 
militarism (Daley and Popplewell 2016). It dramatically accelerated a 
worrying governance trend, particularly notable since the contested 2010 
elections, that paved the way for a return to increasingly authoritarian, de 
facto one-party rule (Vandeginste 2011; International Crisis Group 2012; 
Curtis 2013). The paper describes and explains how legal loopholes – the 
unique combination of constitutional ambiguity and legal enforcement 
gaps – impacted the positions and strategies adopted by domestic and 
international actors. Without such loopholes, the crisis would surely have 
unfolded differently. Second, the paper contributes to the process of 
theory building on the legal engineering of democratic governance and 
on executive term limits. Most of the literature looks at the rationale, the 
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types and effects of term limits in general, some scholars focusing more 
particularly on their link with democracy (Maltz 2007; Reyntjens 2016), 
constitutionalism (Fombad and Inegbedion 2010), and institutionalisa-
tion of political power (Posner and Young 2007). This paper adds to the 
more recent literature on the evasion and manipulation of term limits 
(Ginsburg et al. 2011; Corrales and Penfold 2014) and on the role of 
international actors (Carter 2016). However, unlike other papers that 
mostly adopt a thematic, comparative, or continent-wide approach, this 
paper zooms in on one case study, paying special attention to the politi-
cal use of term-limit legislation by domestic and external actors and the 
mutual influence between the domestic and international levels. In so 
doing, some much needed light is also shed on the “black box” of the 
bargaining dynamics between aid-dependent governments and their 
international partners in political crisis situations (Molenaers et al. 2015).  
The paper is based on continuous monitoring of political develop-
ments in Burundi, unstructured interviews and conversations with key 
domestic and international informants – all of whom requested confidenti-
ality and therefore remain undisclosed, and document analysis of both 
public and confidential written sources, including diplomatic cables and 
internal policy notes. It does not analyse the position of all domestic politi-
cal and civil society actors or of all of Burundi’s international partners. A 
selection has been made from among those international actors who, for 
political and/or financial reasons, have been most active and influential in 
this particular case of an aid-dependent post-conflict country (primarily the 
African Union, East African Community, European Union, United Na-
tions, Belgium, South Africa, Tanzania, and the United States). The paper 
presents the overall picture, using examples to illustrate the different types 
of responses to the term-limit loopholes. 
Important attention is paid to the temporal dimension of the object 
of study. In at least two respects, time is an important variable. First, a 
chronological research perspective reveals a remarkable evolution in the 
international actors’ use of Burundi’s legal third-term framework, probably 
signalling an evolution in their political position and strategy vis-à-vis not 
only Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term but also Burundi’s wider political and 
security crisis. Second, electoral legal deadlines and procedural sequences 
created or limited opportunities for both domestic and international actors.  
Outline
The paper starts with a timeline of the main episodes in Burundi’s third-
term tale. As will be developed in more detail, some of them coincide with 
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crucial turning points in the political use of Burundi’s third-term legislation 
by domestic and international actors. Next, the legal loopholes are intro-
duced. The paper then turns to the core analysis, distinguishing three types 
of responses vis-à-vis the legal loopholes: (i) the Constitution-based re-
sponse, (ii) the Arusha Agreement–based response, and (iii) the judicial 
response. In all three sections, particular attention is paid to the mutual 
influence between domestic and international actors in regard to the posi-
tions they adopted. 
Timeline
28 August 2000 Signature of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA). 
16 November 
2003 
Signature of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between the transitional 
government and the CNDD-FDD movement. 
18 March 2005 Promulgation of the new Constitution of Burundi. 
26 August 2005 President Nkurunziza – indirectly elected – sworn in. 
26 August 2010 President Nkurunziza – directly elected – sworn in. 
February 2012 In a confidential handwritten note to the president, his spokesperson 
explains that as a guarantor of the Constitution the president should 
not aspire to a third term. 
September 
2013 
CNDD-FDD chairman Pascal Nyabenda declares to a provincial party 
congress that Burundians have elected their president only once. 
November 
2014 
In a letter to the president, most ex-FDD generals speak out against a 
third term.* 
13 February 
2015 
A leaked note by SNR intelligence service head General Godefroid 
Niyombare (ex-FDD) warns of the consequences of a third term. Five 
days later, Niyombare is dismissed as head of the SNR.** 
6 March 2015 The Conference of Catholic Bishops speaks out against a third term. 
13 March 2015 A UN Security Council mission visits Burundi. 
20 March 2015 In an open letter, 17 high-ranking CNDD-FDD cadres speak out against 
a third term. The letter is followed by a purge of party dissidents. 
25 April 2015 The CNDD-FDD nominates Nkurunziza as its presidential candidate. 
26 April 2015  Start of the anti–third-term protests in Bujumbura. 
27 April 2015 CNDD-FDD senators petition the Constitutional Court for an 
interpretation of articles 96 and 302 of the Constitution. 
4 May 2015 The Constitutional Court rules in favour of Nkurunziza’s third term. 
13 May 2015 EAC Summit on Burundi and failed coup d’état attempt by General 
Niyombare.*** 
31 May 2015 Second EAC Summit on Burundi. 
21 July 2015 Presidential election. 
20 August 2015 President Nkurunziza – directly elected – sworn in. 
*  In accordance with the military power-sharing arrangement of November 2003, Burundi’s 
security forces are composed of former rebels (referred to as ex-FDD) and former members of 
the government army (or ex-FAB). Nkurunziza’s closest aides, ex-FDD generals Adolphe 
Nshimirimana and Alain Guillaume Bunyoni, did not sign the letter. 
**  SNR = Service National de Renseignements 
***  EAC = East African Community.
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Legal Loopholes 
Unlike in most other cases of executive term-limit evasion, Burundi’s 
Constitution was not amended, replaced, or ignored (Ginsburg et al. 
2011: 1831). While there were unsuccessful attempts to replace and, 
alternatively, amend the Constitution in March 2014,1 the Burundi case is 
notably different from the constitutional amendment processes that re-
moved or softened term limits in Uganda (2005), Congo-Brazzaville 
(2015), and Rwanda (2015) so as to allow the incumbent to renew his 
term without violating their respective constitutions.2 Rather, Burundi’s 
third-term legal framework was characterised by a two-pronged loop-
hole, consisting of an unintended ambiguity of the legal norm and an 
omission in the enforcement scheme. This enabled the executive to 
maintain an appearance of legality and – to the extent that it is derived 
from rule adherence (Beetham 2013) – legitimacy. 
First, the ambiguity was caused by the combination of two articles of 
the Constitution of 18 March 2005. Article 96 states that the president of 
the republic is elected by direct universal suffrage for a mandate of five 
years, renewable once. Article 302, which is included in a transitional 
chapter, states,  
As an exception, the first President of the Republic in the post-
transition period shall be elected by the National Assembly and 
the Senate […], with a two-thirds majority of the members. […] 
The President elected in the first post-transition period cannot dis-
solve Parliament.3 
The most reasonable interpretation appears to be that article 302 provides 
an exception only regarding the modality of the presidential election (indir-
1  The proposal did not seek to amend article 96 (which lays down the two-term 
limit). However, the draft amendment – logically – proposed removing the Con-
stitution’s transitional chapter XV, which includes article 302 (see below). Ac-
cording to many local observers, this was an attempt to delay the application of 
the term limit until 2020. The proposed constitutional amendment fell one vote 
short of the required four-fifths majority in the National Assembly. For the fasci-
nating eyewitness account of the failed constitutional amendment by the chair-
man of the National Assembly at the time, see <www.africania-news.com/partie-
2-nkurunziza-tente-de-modifier-la-constitution-et-echoue-de-justesse> (accessed 
23 August 2016). 
2  During the hearings organised by the National Commission for Inter-Burundian 
Dialogue (CNDI) in early 2016, proposals to amend the Constitution, including 
term limits, have repeatedly been put forward. This may suggest a forthcoming, 
renewed attempt to amend the Constitution. 
3  Author’s translation. 
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ect instead of direct). However, a strictly literal reading opens the door to a 
potential alternative interpretation – namely, that the Constitution created 
a special first post-transition presidency which does not “count” as a first 
term under article 96. Given this ambiguity in the letter, the intention of 
Burundi’s Constitution drafters is an appropriate source to guide the 
interpretation of the Constitution. The explanatory memorandum of the 
Draft Constitution of 18 March 2005 refers to the Arusha Peace and Rec-
onciliation Agreement (APRA) of 28 August 2000, widely recognised as 
Burundi’s foundational roadmap to peace and stability, as its main source 
of inspiration. The APRA, a peace accord that was signed after two years 
of international mediation led by former Tanzanian president Julius Nye-
rere and former South African president Nelson Mandela, contained a 
constitutional blueprint for post-conflict Burundi. On presidential term 
limits, it unambiguously stated that the president “shall be elected for a 
term of five years, renewable only once. No one may serve more than two 
presidential terms.”4 As shown below, drawing normative guidance from 
the APRA was an important strategy of third-term opponents. 
Second, an enforcement gap reinforced the ambiguity and its politi-
cal instrumentalisation. The two bodies in charge of applying Burundi’s 
electoral legislation are the electoral commission and the Constitutional 
Court. As documented in more detail elsewhere (Vandeginste 2014), in 
addition to a widespread perception that the two bodies cannot function 
independently – particularly regarding politically sensitive matters, legal 
constraints on their powers and procedures also reduced their ability to 
enforce the term limit. Burundi’s electoral commission, the Commission 
Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI), is in charge of receiving and 
validating the nomination of electoral candidates. It is standard practice 
of CENI to give a purely administrative meaning to this function. Ap-
plied to the presidential elections, this means that the commission merely 
verifies whether the file holding the nomination of a particular candidate 
contains the 12 elements requested under article 101 of the electoral 
code (birth certificate, attestation of residence, etc.) (CENI 2015). These 
elements correspond to the conditions of eligibility laid down in article 
94 of the code (nationality, residence, age, etc.). However, articles 94 and 
101 of the electoral code do not refer to the presidential term limit laid 
down in the Constitution. Therefore, when administratively validating 
the nomination of Nkurunziza (and other presidential candidates), CENI 
did not verify whether the candidate had served the maximum number 
4  The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (English and French ver-
sions) and the Constitution (in French only) can be consulted online at <www. 
uantwerpen.be/burundi> (accessed 23 August 2016). 
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of terms in office permitted under the Constitution. A rejection of a 
candidacy can be challenged before the Constitutional Court. However, 
once the CENI has validated a nomination, its decision cannot be chal-
lenged. Several foreign diplomats wrongly argued that opposition parties 
would be able to challenge CENI’s acceptance of Nkurunziza’s candi-
dacy. Was this mere ignorance? Or did they comfortably hide behind the 
legal framework whose enforcement they knew to be deficient? The 
Constitutional Court ruled on 4 May 2015 in response to a request for 
interpretation of the Constitution. We will return to the actors’ posi-
tioning vis-à-vis the ruling below. 
The Constitution-based Response 
Domestic Actors 
Constitutionalism is fundamentally preoccupied with limiting governmen-
tal power in order to counter arbitrariness, and it has been argued that 
respecting executive term limits is a core element of modern constitution-
alism (Fombad and Inegbedion 2010). Advocates of executive term limits 
usually invoke the value of constitutionalism. An incumbent’s disrespect 
for a constitution normally is a forceful argument in the hands of oppo-
nents. In the case of Burundi, however, the value of constitutionalism was 
strategically invoked by third-term supporters. This was the direct conse-
quence of the ambiguous wording of the constitutional term limit. Because 
the Constitution of Burundi could be read as permitting an additional 
term, Nkurunziza supporters framed the issue as a legal matter and put 
forward rule-of-law arguments, suggesting that only those legally in charge 
of interpreting the Constitution had the legitimacy to do so (see below). In 
most cases, incumbents put forward political arguments that allegedly 
trump the constitutional term limit. They may argue that term limits are 
not a good idea after all, that they are not fit for a post-conflict state that 
requires stability, that the people want their leader to stay in office, and so 
on. In the case of Burundi, however, the incumbent at no point opposed 
the principle of term limits, nor did he feel the need to use or counter 
political arguments, comfortably playing the legality card. For instance, when 
Afrobarometer (2015) published its Burundi report, showing increased 
popular support for term limits, the government comfortably agreed and 
merely noted that the term limit simply did not apply yet. In summary, 
some important advantages of having legality on one’s side are demon-
strated here. First, acting in accordance with constitutional law is a power-
ful argument because of its association with the prevention of anarchy and 
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arbitrariness. Second, the incumbent moves the debate away from political 
arguments, which is quite convenient given the anti–third-term street pro-
tests in Bujumbura. A third important strategic advantage links the do-
mestic use of the constitutionality argument with external legitimation of a 
presidential third term. Indeed, for the pro-Nkurunziza camp, it was quite 
convenient that Burundi’s international partners initially adopted the same 
Constitution-based position. 
International Actors 
In response to questions in Parliament, the Belgian minister of foreign 
affairs stated in May and in October 2014 that Belgium was against third 
presidential terms if they were not permitted by the relevant constitution. 
Although Belgium was well aware, as were other international actors, of 
the ambiguity in Burundi’s Constitution, it merely referred to the general 
principle of constitutionality. This was inspired, first, by the desire to 
adopt the same, principled position on all countries in the Central Afri-
can region and not to interfere with country-specific aspects. Adopting a 
consistent position, however, had a very different meaning in Burundi 
than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and 
Rwanda, in all of which term limits were imposed without constitutional 
ambiguity. Second, this position allowed international partners not to 
choose sides. Until February 2015 – while they knew there was internal 
dissidence but did not expect the anti–third-term movement outside and 
within the dominant party to be as strong as later turned out to be the 
case – it was convenient for international actors to respond to the legal 
loophole in a way that allowed them not to indicate a political preference 
for or against a third term of Nkurunziza. It was only later, from late 
February 2015 onwards, that some of them invoked the Arusha Agree-
ment (see below). This shift suggests that their position on the legal 
loopholes – and on the third-term issue in general – was in reality driven 
by what those international actors considered to be a politically desirable 
outcome of the crisis (such as stability, which at the time might have 
been safeguarded through a political compromise around Nkurunziza’s – 
constitutional or unconstitutional – candidacy), although they initially 
rhetorically packaged their position as adherence to constitutionalism. 
Observations
Senior diplomatic informants confirmed that leaving the legal ambiguity 
unaddressed – while being aware of its existence – and responding to the 
term-limit issue on the basis of purely political considerations was a delib-
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erate choice on the part of Burundi’s international development partners. 
Interviews with national political and civil society actors showed that this 
had very important implications at the domestic level. First, the vacillation 
between the principled rhetoric that term limits are a matter of democracy 
and constitutionalism and the pragmatic position based on political con-
siderations resulted in incoherent signals being sent by Burundi’s interna-
tional partners. This was not at all reassuring for potential (but hesitant) 
dissidents within the CNDD-FDD and, at the same time, it was a wonder-
ful present to the Burundian government, which has longstanding exper-
tise in playing external actors against one another. Second, this position 
enabled international partners to try to use the third-term issue as leverage 
to obtain concessions on the quality of the electoral process in general. 
France, in particular, promoted the idea of a bargain between acceptance 
of a third presidential term and guarantees of inclusive, free, and fair local 
and legislative elections. The government was well aware of this strategy 
and, realising that the passage of time disadvantaged the opposition, em-
braced it without making any meaningful concessions. Third, the failure to 
solve the legal ambiguity in tempore non suspecto (say, in 2011) made it much 
more difficult for the opposition (within and outside the CNDD-FDD) 
and civil society to use the argument of constitutionalism and legality. To 
the contrary, legality became an argument in the hands of the third-term 
advocates. The government consistently used the argument of constitu-
tionality also regarding other aspects of the electoral crisis – for instance, 
when it refused to delay the elections, which had been requested by most 
international partners. Fourth, domestic third-term opponents gradually 
came to realise that the legal ambiguity enabled international partners, in 
case of an eventual intra-regime consensus around Nkurunziza’s nomina-
tion, to condone the third term and to defend it as a combination of con-
stitutional legality and political stability. Third-term opponents therefore 
felt that the international community was an unreliable partner. 
The Arusha Agreement–based Response 
On 24 February 2015 – one week after the head of the powerful intelli-
gence service SNR was dismissed for opposing Nkurunziza’s third term – 
US Special Envoy Russ Feingold stated,  
Unlike the DRC and other countries on the continent, the Burun-
dian Constitution could be read to allow President Nkurunziza to 
hold a third term. The United States does not refute that there is a 
legal argument for a third term. Instead […] the United States is 
urging the Burundian government to ensure that the upcoming 
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elections are consistent with the Arusha Accords, which state un-
ambiguously that no president shall serve more than two terms.  
He added, “So, we are not making a legal argument here,” and referred 
to the merits and the legitimacy of the APRA as a successful roadmap to 
peace in Burundi (USIP 2015: 10). This was the first explicit reference 
made by an international partner to the APRA as an authoritative, un-
ambiguous source by which to settle the third-term issue. Three days 
later, during a debate at the Wilson Centre, US Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of State David Gilmour reiterated the argument. In his reply, Bu-
rundi’s ambassador in Washington, however, stated that the presidential 
elections should be held according to Burundi’s Constitution. This illus-
trates the next stage in the positioning of domestic and international 
actors vis-à-vis the term-limit loopholes. 
Domestic Actors 
By early 2012, opposition politicians had begun to refer to the APRA as 
the norm prohibiting President Nkurunziza’s third term. This was also 
the argument of civil society organisations opposing a third term. In an 
open letter from 8 October 2013, thirteen advocacy groups requested 
that the president not violate the APRA or the Constitution, which was 
(accurately) presented as an emanation of the APRA. This position was 
also adopted throughout the NGO campaign “Stop the Third Term” 
launched in January 2015, which put forward the APRA primarily on 
grounds of legitimacy but also of legality by presenting the APRA either 
as a supra-constitutional text or as the Constitution’s main travaux prépa-
ratoires and therefore the most authoritative source of interpretation in 
case of ambiguity. It should be noted that, at that time, the legal status of 
the APRA was most unclear. The civil society lobbying campaign suc-
cessfully reframed the third-term issue as a matter of respect for the 
APRA (and the peace and stability that resulted from it), rather than as a 
“technical” constitutional issue. The SNR memo of 13 February 2015 
also repeatedly referred to the APRA as the appropriate framework in 
which to handle the third-term issue. To underscore its importance, the 
memo systematically referred to the esteem for the APRA held by Bu-
rundi’s international partners (the United States, France, Tanzania, South 
Africa, Belgium, the European Union, and Uganda). On the legal value 
of the APRA, the SNR suggested that in the hierarchy of norms it was 
superior to the Constitution (SNR 2015: 13). In March 2015, the Catho-
lic bishops also argued that the APRA term limit must be respected and 
that the Constitution must be interpreted on that basis (CECAB 2015: 2). 
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This forced the government and the international partners to clarify their 
view on the APRA’s status in the debate over the third term. 
Without denying the historical importance of the APRA in Burundi’s 
conflict-to-peace transition, the government in several ways downplayed 
the APRA’s relevance for addressing the third-term issue. First, it noted 
that the APRA was a political agreement, signed with several reservations 
by a number of parties, which could by no means be superior to the Con-
stitution in Burundi’s hierarchy of norms. Second, as stressed by President 
Nkurunziza in his meeting with the UN Security Council mission on 13 
March 2015, the government time and again noted that the APRA was not 
the only peace agreement that brought an end to the armed conflict in 
Burundi (UN Security Council 2015a: 18). At least as important was the 
Global Ceasefire Agreement of 16 November 2003 – signed between the 
transitional government established on the basis of the APRA and the 
CNDD-FDD rebel movement – to which no one ever attributed any 
constitutional status. Why then should, a contrario, the APRA be considered 
superior to the Constitution? In his address of 18 March 2015 to the 
meeting of the Burundi configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commis-
sion, Burundi’s permanent representative summarised the position of the 
government that the Constitution adopted by referendum “must take 
precedence over any other legal or political agreement” and noted that all 
regional actors also insisted on the supremacy of Burundi’s Constitution 
(Government of Burundi 2015: 2). 
International Actors 
As noted above, it was not until late February 2015 – when “dissident” 
General Niyombare had already been dismissed and other ex-FDD gen-
erals had closed ranks around Nkurunziza’s candidacy – that Burundi’s 
international partners started referring to the APRA. Although some 
ambiguity in their positions remained (see below), a reference to Arusha 
in connection with the third-term issue gradually became diplomatic 
shorthand for a rejection of Nkurunziza’s third term. The United States 
was the most outspoken actor voicing that position. During an impro-
vised press conference at Bujumbura Airport at the end of the UNSC 
mission to Burundi on 13 March 2015, Ambassador Samantha Power of 
the United States stated that “the words in the Arusha Accords are very 
clear that a president can only stand for two terms. That is the position 
of the [United States].” After Nkurunziza’s nomination on 25 April, the 
United States “deeply regretted” the decision by the CNDD-FDD to 
“disregard the term-limit provisions of the Arusha Agreement” (US 
Department of State 2015).  
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Other international partners strategically maintained rather ambigu-
ous stances when referring to the Arusha Agreement. When I confronted 
one senior Belgian diplomat with the ambiguous nature of the Arusha-
based response adopted by some international actors, he said, “Cela fait 
partie du plaisir” (“That’s part of the fun”), which seemed to evince the 
deliberate quality of the ambiguity. Those actors were leaving room for 
different interpretations of their position. On 16 March 2015, the EU 
Council noted, 
There are currently calls in Burundi for the Arusha Agreement to be 
honoured, particularly as regards the possibility of a third presiden-
tial term. These calls cannot be disregarded. (European Council 
2015)  
This statement did not indicate the European Union’s own position. The 
European Union merely called upon the authorities not to disregard the 
voices calling for an Arusha-based response to the legal loophole. Within 
the European Union, certain member states were of the view that this 
position continued to allow for a consensus in favour of a third term for 
the incumbent president. Similarly, in a phone call to President Nkurun-
ziza on 27 March 2015, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged him 
to carefully consider the potential consequences of his decisions in the 
run-up to the presidential election, pointing to “the many voices in Bu-
rundi and the international community calling for strict adherence to the 
letter and spirit of the Arusha Accord, which is the basis for the coun-
try’s Constitution” (UN Secretary-General 2015). Other actors, such as 
the UNSC in its press statement of 17 April 2015, vaguely referred to the 
potential risk that the elections “undermine the peace sustained for al-
most a decade in Burundi, in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement,” with-
out explicitly linking the APRA to the third-term issue (UN Security Coun-
cil 2015b). 
The position of Tanzania – politically crucial as EAC chair since 
February 2015 and as a longstanding ally of the CNDD-FDD (Nin-
dorera 2012: 19) – was highly sophisticated vis-à-vis the legal loophole. 
Speaking at a meeting of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
in Bujumbura on 19 March 2015, Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete 
made four suggestions to Burundi’s leaders. First, he urged them to re-
spect the Constitution and the APRA to the letter and the spirit. Applied 
to the third-term debate, this could logically be read (and was indeed 
read) as an opposition to the third term. Second and third, he urged 
them not to resort to violence but to opt for dialogue. Fourth, he called 
upon Burundians to “involve the laws of Burundi when you feel the 
Constitution or the electoral laws have been violated” (EALA 2015: 15). 
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This last suggestion was warmly welcomed by the government for two 
reasons: it framed the third-term debate as a legal dispute, and it referred 
to national judicial mechanisms as the appropriate forums in which to 
settle the issue (see also below).  
Observations
The APRA-based response can be subdivided into two types, defined by 
their reliance on arguments based on “Arusha legitimacy” versus “Arusha 
legality.” Actors generally combined yet attributed different weight to these 
two arguments. The “Arusha legitimacy”–based response referred to the 
achievements of the APRA in bringing peace, reconciliation, and institu-
tional stability to Burundi and to the spirit of dialogue, consensus, and 
compromise that would ideally characterise the various dimensions of 
the elections. Emphasising this legitimacy argument also meant keeping 
the third term in the political sphere and outside the legal realm. How-
ever, particularly the domestic actors involved in the anti–third-term 
protest campaign also used the “Arusha legality” argument. Seen as a 
legal source, the APRA allowed for only one possible valid interpretation 
of the Constitution.  
Faced with the APRA-based response, the government was forced 
to incorporate the APRA into its own narrative, which it had been re-
luctant to do, for a variety of reasons (including a longstanding aversion 
of part of the CNDD-FDD towards the APRA, which it had not negoti-
ated itself but joined three years after its initial signature). The govern-
ment cleverly jumped on the “Arusha legality” subtype. In essence, it saw 
the APRA as one of several legal standards applicable to the electoral 
process. It insisted that, like in all other countries, the Constitution was 
the supreme legal text. In so doing, and finding support in Tanzania’s 
ambiguous position, the government also prepared the groundwork for 
using the third response, based on an argument of judicial enforcement. 
This brought to the fore the other aspect of the legal loophole: the en-
forcement gap. 
The APRA-based response leads to another, more general insight 
about legal loopholes and peace agreements. At first sight, using the 
APRA to settle the term-limit issue resolved the ambiguity. Its wording is 
indeed unambiguous when it comes to the two-term maximum. How-
ever, rather than closing the legal loophole, the APRA displaced it. The 
APRA-based approach did not encounter any difficulty in regard to the 
wording of the norm, but was weakened by the uncertainty of the legal 
status of the peace agreement in general, and of its constitutional corpus 
specifically. Is the APRA a source of constitutional law? (And, if so, what 
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chapters?) And where should it be situated in the hierarchy of norms 
(Vandeginste 2016)? These questions had not in tempore non suspecto been 
addressed since the signing of the APRA. This omission significantly 
weakened the position of advocates of an “Arusha legality”–based ap-
proach to oppose the third term. 
The Judicial Response 
As the crisis heightened with demonstrations immediately following 
President Nkurunziza’s nomination, third-term supporters played the 
ultimate rule-of-law card. A legally competent body, through a legally 
pre-established procedure, should settle what the government had con-
tinuously framed as a primarily legal issue. The enforcement gap – the 
difficulty in implementing the legal term-limit norm presented above – 
comes into play here. On 27 April 2015, 14 CNDD-FDD senators (all of 
them close to Nkurunziza) asked the Constitutional Court for an inter-
pretation of articles 96 and 302 of the Constitution. On 4 May 2015, the 
Court ruled that the APRA did not permit a third presidential term but 
that the Constitution drafters in 2005 wrongly5 interpreted the APRA. 
According to the Court, under the transitional article 302, an exceptional 
presidential mandate was created that had nothing to do with article 96. 
On that basis, the Court concluded that one final renewal of the (then) 
current presidential term was not contrary to the Constitution.6 The 
ruling was the most controversial decision ever handed down by Bu-
rundi’s Constitutional Court. The Court’s vice president, intimidated 
because of his position during the Court’s deliberations, fled the country 
(Nimpagaritse and Parmentier 2015). Without going into the substance 
5  Kavakure (2016: 30), former minister of foreign affairs, argues – without pro-
viding convincing evidence – that this was not a mistake but a deliberate act to 
enable the winner of the 2005 indirect elections to renew his term two times. 
6  Court ruling RCCB 303 (with an unofficial translation in English) can be con-
sulted online at <www.uantwerpen.be/burundi>, section “Constitution,” chapter 
“Cour constitutionnelle.” Strictly speaking, this was not a case of judicial en-
forcement of the norm. The Court interpreted two articles of the Constitution, 
it did not render a final judgement on Nkurunziza’s candidacy. Nkurunziza had 
not even introduced his candidacy when the Court handed down its judgement. 
A counterfactual analysis further clarifies this point. If the Court had decided 
that the Constitution must be read as imposing a strict maximum of two terms, 
Nkurunziza’s first post-transition term would also fall under the term limit. 
However, legally speaking, this would not have prevented Nkurunziza from in-
troducing his candidacy or prevented CENI from validating it, given the latter’s 
restrictive, administrative interpretation of its own role (see above). 
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of the Court’s argument (see, however, Kabumba 2015 and Vandeginste 
2015b), what interests us here is the position adopted by domestic and 
international actors vis-à-vis the procedure and the ruling, both before 
and after the judgement. 
Domestic Actors 
As early as April 2013, in an interview with Jeune Afrique magazine, Presi-
dent Nkurunziza referred to the Constitutional Court and CENI as the 
only two bodies in charge of validating the nomination of presidential 
candidates. In his address to the meeting of the Burundi configuration of 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission on 18 March 2015, Burundi’s per-
manent representative noted that Burundi was faced with the question of 
interpretation – rather than review – of the Constitution and that this is 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, not of political 
parties, the media, civil society, or religious or other partners (Govern-
ment of Burundi 2015: 2). This position was reiterated time and again by 
the government, in particular in its contacts with international partners, 
where it stressed that it acted in conformity with standard practice in 
other states abiding by the rule of law.  
When the CNDD-FDD senators petitioned the Court, they asked the 
judges to interpret the Constitution but argued, at the same time, that the 
Court had no jurisdiction to take into account the relevant APRA provi-
sions. Given the unambiguous wording of the APRA on the executive 
term limit, this indicated a pro–third-term motivation of the petitioners. 
Somewhat paradoxically, third-term opponents from civil society also 
argued that the Court could not interpret the APRA; however, they did so 
for another reason: in their view, because the third-term issue needed to be 
addressed on the basis of the APRA and because the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to interpret that text, the Court could not deal with the case. 
Above all, this indicated their lack of confidence in the independence of 
the Court (see, e.g., OAG 2015). The appointment by presidential decree 
of the Constitutional Court’s president, Charles Ndagijimana, to the board 
of directors of the national brewery company Brarudi on 8 April 2015 was 
perceived as an additional attempt to secure the sympathy of Constitu-
tional Court judges. 
In his address to the nation two days after the judgement, President 
Nkurunziza promised to respect the ruling and announced that, if 
elected, his third term would be his last as requested by the Constitu-
tional Court. The ruling enabled the government to reinforce its legal 
framing of the third-term question. Blocking Nkurunziza’s candidacy 
would prevent him from exercising his constitutional rights. This rights-
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based argument was occasionally also linked with two political argu-
ments. First, reference was made to the politically dangerous conse-
quences of denying the president’s constitutional right to be re-elected. 
In some meetings with international diplomats, as if to warn them, gov-
ernment officials noted that preventing the president from exercising his 
constitutional rights might lead to violence on behalf of his supporters. 
Second, in particular in exchanges with African colleagues, respect for the 
court ruling was framed as defending national sovereignty against neo-
colonial interventionism.  
International Actors 
Although many had doubts about the independence of the court, Bu-
rundi’s international partners obviously could not, as a matter of princi-
ple, publicly discredit the judicial response to the loophole. Nonetheless, 
as illustrated below, the procedure divided the international response 
even further. Also, the judgement gave ammunition to international sup-
porters of the third term. 
Prior to the ruling, some actors – among others, the AU Peace and 
Security Council and the chair of the Burundi configuration of the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission – urged all stakeholders to respect the ver-
dict. Other international actors – for instance, Belgium – remained silent 
on the procedure and on the ruling, both before and after. The United 
States did not comment on the judgement but noted the troubling pres-
sure the Burundian government put on the court and, after the ruling, 
maintained its position that Nkurunziza should respect the two-term 
limit unambiguously laid down in the APRA.  
AU Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, suspected 
by some pro-government press of defending a donor-driven agenda 
rather than representing the view of AU member states, adopted a re-
markable position. In a television interview three days after the court 
ruling, Dlamini-Zuma noted that the judgement went against most other 
interpretations commonly made of the Constitution and the APRA.7 
Asked whether she urged all Burundians to respect the court ruling, she 
tellingly answered that sometimes legality is not the only aspect to take 
into consideration, in particularly when peace is at stake. At the second 
Emergency Summit of the EAC Heads of State on 31 May 2015, the AU 
Commission chair spoke out against a third term for President Nkurun-
ziza. With the benefit of hindsight, this meeting was crucial in the inter-
7  See <www.youtube.com/watch?v=4-ZXn7MMSyE> (accessed 23 August 2016). 
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national decision making on Nkurunziza’s third term. Of particular im-
portance here is the role the Constitutional Court ruling played at the 
emergency summit and at two other EAC meetings held prior to it, on 
15 and 30 May.  
On 15 May 2015, the EAC attorney generals met following the di-
rective issued by the heads of state at the first (interrupted) summit of 
13 May. Only two attorney generals (of Uganda and Rwanda) attended the 
meeting, as did a representative of the Kenyan attorney general’s office. 
Tanzania did not take part. The attorney generals advised that in terms 
of the Constitution and the APRA, President Nkurunziza was not eligi-
ble to seek re-election. They de facto overruled the court’s judgement. 
However, given the ad hoc nature of the meeting and the absence of the 
Tanzanian attorney general, the status and the weight of the attorney 
generals’ opinion remained unclear. On 30 May 2015, the EAC con-
vened at the ministerial level. This meeting proposed two options to the 
EAC Summit for consideration (EAC 2015: 4–7). The first, preferred 
option was for the EAC Summit to convince President Nkurunziza to 
withdraw his candidature. It was argued that this would resolve the con-
troversy on the interpretation of the Constitution and the APRA. How-
ever, the main weakness of this scenario was said to be the inability of 
the incumbent to exercise his right to run based on the court ruling. The 
second option was for the EAC Summit to suggest that elections take 
place with President Nkurunziza participating as a candidate. According 
to the EAC ministerial meeting, a major strength of this option was its 
conformity with the court ruling (EAC 2015: 6). Certain conditions were 
attached to this scenario, including a commitment by the president and 
his party not to amend the Constitution with respect to term limits, if re-
elected. At the summit itself on 31 May – which was held in the absence 
of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda – President Kikwete of Tanzania 
and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda declared that what mattered 
most was the Constitutional Court ruling, not the advice of the EAC 
attorney generals. The court ruling thus was the formal legal argument in 
support of what the two presidents considered to be the politically most 
convenient decision. In the end, the summit merely took note of the 
legal ambiguity and suggested that a negotiated political solution had 
been found by the Burundians themselves (EAC 2015: 9). The commu-
niqué of the summit did not adopt a position on the third term. This was 
welcomed by the Burundian government as a major diplomatic victory.8 
8  Although at the summit, South African president Jacob Zuma had joined the AU 
Commission chairperson in her opposition to the third term, he immediately af-
terwards expressed his support for the position adopted by the summit. In a tele-
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Observations
The Constitutional Court ruling intensified the political polarisation (UN 
Security Council 2015c: 16). Despite a widespread feeling that the Con-
stitutional Court judges could not rule independently and despite sug-
gestions that the verdict may even have been drafted “elsewhere” (Nim-
pagaritse and Parmentier 2015: 6), the ruling played a critical role in the 
political responses to the third-term issue. It enabled Nkurunziza sup-
porters to frame the issue as a matter of enjoyment of constitutional 
rights rather than as a question of political desirability. It also enabled 
President Nkurunziza to make a concession (namely, the promise that 
his third term would be his last, as requested by the court), which do-
mestic opponents did not take seriously but which, at the international 
level, reinforced the bargaining position of those external actors who 
were willing to accept an additional term under certain conditions. Fur-
thermore, openly discrediting the court ruling would amount to a viola-
tion of both national sovereignty and fundamental rule-of-law principles, 
a perception Western partners wanted to avoid transmitting and, at the 
same time, a compelling argument also made by other African heads of 
state. Finally, the ruling enabled some EAC heads of state to present 
their – politically speaking – preferred scenario as the legally most sound 
option. This, paradoxically, enabled President Museveni, one of the co-
signatories and guarantors of the APRA, to support President Nkurun-
ziza’s candidacy. Seen from that perspective, Museveni’s appointment as 
EAC mediator for the Burundi crisis at the third Emergency Summit on 
6 July 2015 constituted an announcement of the EAC acceptance of the 
fait accompli that President Nkurunziza would remain in office.  
The Constitutional Court ruling was challenged on legal grounds at 
the international level. This initiative, however, backfired to the diplo-
matic advantage of the government. On 6 July 2015, two civil society 
organisations filed an application at the EAC Court of Justice, arguing 
that the ruling of the Constitutional Court violated the APRA and the 
Constitution, as well as the democratic principles enshrined in the EAC 
treaty. As a remedy, the claimants requested that the Court of Justice 
order the quashing of the decisions of the Constitutional Court and of 
CENI, which had allowed Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term. The 
applicants also requested interim orders directing the government to 
postpone the presidential elections. On 20 July 2015, the EAC Court of 
                                                                                                    
vision interview on 3 June 2016, he said, “Once there is a court decision, that 
means we’ve got to look at it from that point of view” (<www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=46YAuBg36p4>, accessed 23 August 2016). 
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Justice decided that it was neither judicious nor necessary or desirable to 
issue the interim orders. This decision – not on the merits but on interim 
orders – was politically instrumentalised by the government. While, in 
reality, the case was still pending before the EAC Court of Justice, the 
government repeatedly presented the refusal of interim orders as if it 
were a decision on the merits. In his inaugural address on 20 August 
2015, President Nkurunziza noted that the Constitutional Court ruling 
had been validated by the EAC Court of Justice. The same argument was 
put forward by Burundian representatives at the UN General Assembly 
in October 2015 and at the ACP–EU9 Joint Parliamentary Assembly in 
December 2015. The government thus repeatedly claimed international 
legitimacy on the basis of a deliberately erroneous interpretation of the 
EAC Court of Justice ruling. 
After the Elections 
President Nkurunziza was re-elected on 21 July and sworn in on 20 Au-
gust 2015. Despite calls by domestic third-term opponents not to recog-
nise the institutions put in place after the elections, none of the interna-
tional partners – including those, such as Belgium, who did not recognise 
the result of the elections – took that step. The opposition movement 
CNARED (Conseil National pour le respect de l’Accord d’Arusha pour la 
Paix et la Réconciliation au Burundi et de l’Etat de Droit, National Council 
for the Restoration of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
and the Rule of Law) systematically referred to the Nkurunziza govern-
ment as the “de facto authorities,” which is the qualification used by the 
AU in case of an unconstitutional change of government. The AU itself, 
however, never referred to the Burundi crisis as an unconstitutional 
change of government as defined, in a non-limitative manner, by the 
2007 AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Also, vari-
ous international actors requested that a political dialogue take place to 
solve the crisis. These requests generally included rather vague – not 
specifically related to the third-term issue – calls to respect the APRA. 
Sanctions were imposed and/or announced at various levels (in particu-
lar by the European Union and United States) – none of them, however, 
was directly linked to the third-term issue. 
9 ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States. 
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Conclusion 
An in-depth analysis of the particularities of the Burundi case offers new 
insights into the impact of particular legal settings on the dynamics of a 
political crisis driven by a contested third term. It reveals the important 
implications of the legal contours of an initially unintended term-limit 
evasion scheme. These implications play out at the domestic level (within 
and outside the dominant party of the incumbent) and in the interaction 
between domestic and influential international actors. 
At first sight, a general conclusion one may be tempted to draw from 
Burundi’s term-limits saga is that, despite a decade of investment in post-
conflict state building, legal norms have failed to impose any meaningful 
constraints on the ambition and vested interests of a powerful “big man” 
and his networks. Executive term-limit law does not seem to make any 
difference when the incumbent seeks to remain in power at all costs. In-
deed, keeping in mind more recent developments in Rwanda and Congo-
Brazzaville, Burundi may well have set a precedent for the wider region’s 
continued struggle with the “president-for-life” syndrome (Prempeh 2008: 
120), and symbolised the inability or unwillingness of international actors 
to do something about it, even in an aid-dependent country where few 
geopolitical interests are at stake.  
At the same time, a more nuanced conclusion is that law does play a 
role, though in another manner than may have been expected by consti-
tutional democratic governance engineers. Even in an increasingly au-
thoritarian setting with important rule-of-law deficits, law – and its pre-
sumed legitimising effect – had an important impact on the dynamics of 
the third-term crisis. Although it is impossible to analyse the counter-
factual, our analysis strongly suggests that, without the loopholes, term-
limit legislation would still have led to debate over a third term. This is 
not to suggest that, without the loopholes, there would not have been a 
third-term crisis, but it would most probably have been a different crisis, 
with other local dynamics, with a different balance of power between 
third-term supporters and opponents, and with fewer opportunities for 
international partners to hide behind the loopholes. Because of the loop-
holes, Burundi’s case was unique and counterintuitive, with third-term 
opponents forced to use political arguments and third-term supporters 
playing the card of legality, constitutionalism, and rule of law. This was 
an enormous cost of the legal loophole and of the well-informed deci-
sion of international actors not to insist on settling it before the third-
term crisis erupted.  
The Burundi case indeed shows that legal loopholes offer opportu-
nities to international partners to hide their political preferences (for or 
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against an alternation of power) behind a rhetorical smokescreen of ad-
herence to the paradigm of constitutionalism. This may well have moti-
vated them not to insist that the legal ambiguity be solved in tempore non 
suspecto. Maintaining the ambiguity created room for using the law as a 
political lever (or for pretending to do so), without taking sides too early 
on in the race – without siding with the political actor who in the end 
wins or loses the electoral crisis. Another “cost” (seen from a pro–term-
limit perspective) therefore inevitably was that the loophole gave rise to 
less coherence and to major coordination challenges among international 
actors. 
The analysis of the instrumentalisation of the legal loopholes invites 
additional research into the political positions, strategies, and motivations 
of Burundi’s international partners. The timing and evolution of their 
position vis-à-vis the legal framework suggests that, throughout the crisis, 
their political preferences shifted importantly. A hypothesis seems to be 
that, above all, their position may well have been driven by negative con-
sequentialism: the desire to avoid consequences that were perceived as 
being worse than a term-limit evasion. Such outcomes to be avoided may 
have included: instability (which means tolerating the status quo as long as 
this is likely to be the most stable outcome), a succession struggle (as long 
as there is no credible alternative), difficult diplomatic relations with the 
eventual winner of the crisis (“We were on your side!”), and increasingly 
bad governance after the elections (in particular after the internal agents of 
change had left the CNDD-FDD, leaving room for the more radical in-
cumbent camp). Negative consequentialism may lead to accepting or re-
jecting the third term, depending on the circumstances and the evolution 
in time. Further research is needed to test this hypothesis. 
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Gesetzeslücken und die politischen Implikationen von 
Amtszeitbeschränkungen: Einsichten aus Burundi 
Zusammenfassung: Die Nominierung des amtierenden Präsidenten 
Pierre Nkurunziza zum Präsidentschaftskandidaten bei den nationalen 
Wahlen 2015 löste in Burundi eine tiefe politische Krise aus. Ein entschei-
dender Punkt der Kontoverse um seine dritte Amtszeit war die Frage der 
Rechtmäßigkeit seiner Kandidatur. Der Autor analysiert die Reaktionen 
von Akteuren innerhalb und außerhalb Burundis auf die juristischen 
Schlupflöcher, die für das Rechtsinstitut der Amtszeitbegrenzung in Bu-
rundi kennzeichnend sind. Er unterscheidet drei Formen der Reaktion: 
Erstens beriefen sich Befürworter einer dritten Amtszeit – paradoxer-
weise – auf Verfassungskonformität, ein Wert, auf den sich sonst eher 
Gegner dritter Amtszeiten berufen. Zweitens bezog man sich auf ein Frie-
densabkommen als Rechtsquelle und Rechtsnorm. Drittens wurde das 
Verfassungsgericht angerufen, um die Gesetzeslücke zu schließen. Trotz 
der offensichtlichen Irrelevanz gesetzlicher Normen in einem zunehmend 
autoritär regierten Umfeld spielten rechtliche Überlegungen in der Debatte 
und im Verlauf der politischen Krise zunehmend eine Rolle. Der Fall 
Burundi illustriert zudem die Grenzen von Verfassungsgestaltung als In-
strument zur Sicherung demokratischer Regierungsführung. 
Schlagwörter: Burundi, Wahl/Abstimmung, Amtszeit, politische Unruhen, 
Verfassung, Friedensvertrag 
 
